New quantum computing controls seek to advance efforts by the US and its allies and slow adversaries’ production

With the US and its allies in a semiconductor arms race, the Biden administration is continuing to push its efforts to keep the technology out of the “wrong hands” with new chip-related export controls.

The US Department of Commerce (DOC) this week released an interim final rule that will enforce License Exception Implemented Export Controls (IEC) for a 38-plus member coalition of “like-minded countries.” There is a 60-day public comment period before the final ruling.

“Aligning our controls on quantum and other advanced technologies makes it significantly more difficult for our adversaries to develop and deploy these technologies in ways that threaten our collective security,” Alan Estevez, under secretary for the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), said in a release.

While China is not explicitly named, it’s pretty heavily implied that this applies to that country, although it’s been clear that it has been able to get around such restrictions in the past, including gaining access to highly sought-after Nvidia chips. The DOC release does emphasize, however, that this is part of an ongoing effort to strengthen export controls to “degrade” the military capabilities of Russia and its “enablers,” Iran and Belarus.

Both the Biden and Trump administrations have used export controls to limit access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, explained James Sanders, senior analyst at TechInsights. “Including quantum computing in the latest set of rules is easiest to understand as an extension of controls limiting access to high-performance chips for artificial intelligence,” he told CIO.

Addressing ‘serious threats’ to national security

BIS is enforcing export controls on specific items including:

• Quantum computing: quantum computers, related equipment, components, materials, software and technology used to develop and maintain quantum computers.
• Advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment: tools and machines that are essential for the production of advanced semiconductor devices.
• Gate All-Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET): Technology that produces or develops high-performance computing chips for supercomputers.
• Additive manufacturing items, including software and equipment and other components that produce metal or metal alloy components.

Most commercial and academic work in quantum computing is performed within the 38-plus member coalition, with the “largest and most notable exception” being China, Sanders noted. However, other global efforts such as the Africa Quantum Consortium are likely to be negatively impacted by the rule, as are those operating in countries that do not receive automatic waivers for licensing.

The DOC noted that the goal of the rule is to strengthen relationships with ally countries to ensure that US export controls keep pace with technologies that pose “serious threats” to national security when advanced by antagonists.

“By limiting our adversaries’ ability to leverage US and allied technology innovations, the BIS and its partner organizations help to ensure disruptive technology remains out of reach of adversarial nations,” Philip George, executive technical strategist at InfoSec Global Federal, told CIO. “At the same time, it also fosters greater technology collaboration amongst our allies and international partners alike.”

Enforcement worth watching

There is a long-standing concern that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could be used to break public-key encryption, the underpinning of secure communication on the internet, Sanders noted.

George agreed that achieving a cryptographically relevant quantum computer sooner than expected would be “detrimental” to current post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration and adoption efforts.

These risks are being addressed, most notably via the quantum-resistant cryptography standards released by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) earlier this year. But “adopting and implementing these standards in business or consumer systems takes time,” said Sanders.

He also pointed out that breaking encryption is thought to require a quantum computer with more than one million “perfect” qubits, but that’s still a long way off. For instance, he pointed out, IBM’s Condor quantum processing unit, one of the largest active quantum systems today, has just 1,121 qubits, which are susceptible to environmental noise.

Still, it’s clear that regulations until now haven’t been “perfectly enforced,” Sanders noted, as cloud-based access to high-performance AI hardware persists despite export bans. This new rule, however, homes in more specifically on quantum computing itself, whereas past government actions have addressed higher-level concerns.

“Enforcement of this is worth watching,” he said.